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The aim of this paper is to determine if OPEC acts as a cartel by testing whether the 
production decisions of the different countries are coordinated and if they have an influence 
on oil prices. Relying on cointegration and causality tests in both time series and panel 
settings, our findings show that the OPEC influence has evolved through time, following the 
changes in the oil pricing system. While the influence of OPEC is found to be important just 
after the counter-oil shock, our results show that OPEC is price taker on the majority of the 
considered sub-periods. Finally, by dividing OPEC between savers and spenders, we show 
that it acts as a cartel mainly with a subgroup of its members. 
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1.  I ntroduction 
Since the creation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
1 (OPEC) at the 
beginning of the 1960s, many authors have focused on its role in the oil market and, notably, 
its capability to influence oil prices in both the short and long run (see Dahl and Yücel (1989) 
among others). At the same time, the oil pricing system witnessed major transformations in 
the last 50 years, which can be summarized by a shift from an administered pricing system to 
a market related price since the middle of the 1980s. The posted price period, with  the 
different pricing systems in the physical market Gulf price (Single Basis System), was 
implemented by the International Oil Companies (IOC) at the beginning of the 20
th
A related question has been previously investigated by Dahl and Yücel (1989) who test 
numerous theories about the OPEC behavior. They show that OPEC is not a cartel, and that 
some countries behave in a non-competitive way or with a target revenue goal. Considering 
various sub-periods, Loderer (1985) shows that while the announcements of OPEC decisions 
do not affect prices in the 1974-1980 period, the alternative hypothesis that OPEC could act 
as a cartel is not rejected during the beginning of the 1980s. Using cointegration and Granger 
 Century. 
According to Yergin (1991) and Fattouh (2006), the aim of this pricing regime was to lower 
the tax paid by the IOC to the host countries, leading to a very low and stable official price 
whatever the market conditions. The entry into the market of new large scale players, such as 
the Soviet Union at the end of the 1950s, triggered a major change with a huge surplus of 
production. In reaction, the so-called seven sisters cartel decided to cut by 10 per cent the 
posted prices in the market to safeguard their market share. This factor can be considered as 
the key element which triggered the creation of the OPEC in 1960. Nevertheless, it took 13 
years for the Organization to claim its “market power” in the oil sector. Since 1973, the oil 
market as well as the oil pricing regime have thus experienced a period of continuous change.  
 
Within this context, our aim is to investigate the dynamics of the production behavior of 
countries belonging to the OPEC, as well as non-member countries that are considered as 
major key players in the oil market. More specifically, our aim is to determine if OPEC acts 
as a cartel by testing whether the production decisions of the different countries are 
coordinated and if they have an influence on oil prices. 
 
                                                 
1 OPEC was formed by five countries (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) in September 1960 in 
Baghdad.   3 
causality tests, Gülen (1996) obtains similar findings: OPEC production Granger-causes oil 
prices during the 1982-1993 period, whereas none causality is found for the previous periods 
investigated. Testing different models (namely cartel models, competitive models, target 
revenue models and property rights models), Griffin  (1985) puts forward that the partial 
market sharing is the best fitted model for the OPEC countries, while non-OPEC countries are 
better represented by the competitive model. Other studies consider that OPEC is a divided 
cartel. Hnyilicza and Pindyck (1976) split OPEC in two groups, namely “saver” and 
“spender” countries, the spender countries being composed of members with an immediate 
need for cash and rate of discount lower than the savers, and focuses on the bargaining power 
between these two groups. Following the same typology, Aperjis (1982) concludes that a 
conflict can exist between OPEC members regarding their production decisions. There also 
exists a set of studies concerned with  target behavior models, such as Teece (1982) and 
Adelman (1982) who modeled OPEC behavior according to a target revenue model. Alhajji 
and Huetnner (2000) conclude as well that OPEC does not act as a cartel, and that the target 
revenue model is not rejected for Algeria, Libya and Nigeria. Finally, one can mention the 
works by Johany (1980) focusing on the impact of the uncertainty about property rights, and 
MacAvoy (1982) showing that political events and market fundamentals (a growing demand 
and speculation) have played a key role in explaining the price dynamics during the 1970s, 
more than the OPEC behavior itself. 
 
This brief survey of the literature shows that no consensus exists regarding the OPEC 
production behavior. Our aim is to contribute to this literature by testing if OPEC acts as a 
cartel. To this end, we rely on time series and panel (i) cointegration techniques to investigate 
the existence of a long-term relationship between the production of each member and that of 
the OPEC, and (ii) Granger causality tests to apprehend the influence of OPEC production 
decisions on oil prices.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe the major 
changes observed in the oil pricing regime since the first oil shock, which also define the sub-
periods of our empirical study. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 provides the results 
of cointegration and causality tests. Finally, Section 5 concludes the article. 
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2.  Main changes in the oil pricing regime 
In  1973, the oil market experienced a new  way of pricing with the introduction of the 
Government Selling Price (GSP) or Official Selling Price (OSP). This price can be considered 
as the historical counter-part of the Posted price implemented by the IOC few decades earlier 
This leads to the second sub-period of our study. The 1982-1986 period is characterized by an 
important decline of oil prices, given rise to the oil counter-shock in 1986 with oil prices at 
less than 10 US dollars per barrel. It has also conducted to the implementation of the quotas 
policy by the Organization in March 1982. From 1982 to 1986, the oil pricing system has 
experienced a transition period with the administered OPEC price which lasts until 1985, a 
growing influence of the price in the spot markets and the introduction of the netback pricing 
system in 1986. This latter has been abandoned a few months after due to the implementation 
of a new market share policy from Saudi Arabia. The year 1986 can be considered as a 
milestone in the oil markets with the introduction and the widespread of a new system: the 
market related regime. 
except that the prices were now determined by OPEC, with the Arabian Light (34°, API) as 
the crude marker. OPEC was at that time the dominant player in the market (with more than 
50 per cent of the market share).  
Nevertheless, if this period was marked by the two world oil shocks (1973-1974 and 1979-
1980), with a sharp increase of the prices on the market—from 3.65 to 11.65 US dollars per 
barrel between October and December 1973 in nominal terms, and from around 14.00 US 
dollars in 1978 to 40.85 in November 1980—it also had a significant positive impact on the 
level of production from countries outside the Organization. Thus, during the 1973-1982 
period, the non-OPEC countries’ production registered an increase about 44.5 per cent, with 
Mexico (+ 2.5 millions barrel per day), the United Kingdom (+ 2.0 millions) and Norway (+ 
0.5 million) representing around 45 per cent of this increase. It helps to develop the spot 
markets and can explain the emergence of a dual system in terms of pricing with the 
coexistence of an OPEC reference price (administered price) and a market price. 
It represents the first construction phase of a complex structure on the 
market with the introduction of a pricing system based on three reference prices: West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) for North America, Brent for Europe and South American countries, and 
Oman-Dubai for crude oil sent to the East Asia, by the national Mexican company PEMEX. It 
also represents a sort of “golden youth” on the oil market including the import of the classical 
tools of modern finance (swap, options) created by the financial revolution, the so-called 
“financial big bang” of the early 1980s. During 1986-1993, we observed a sharp increase of   5 
the liquidity (in terms of financial contracts such as Light Sweet Crude Oil) in the financial 
market, especially on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and on the International 
Petroleum Exchange
2
After the introduction at the end of December 2000 of the law modernizing raw materials 
markets—the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
 (IPE). This was followed by a gradual financialization on the market 
during 1993-2001. For example, the number of futures contract in the NYMEX increased by 
more than 40 per cent during this period and at the same time the oil-pricing regime 
experienced some controversy: squeeze, decrease of the liquidity due to a marked decrease of 
the Brent and WTI production which have introduced some doubts regarding the efficiency of 
the price formation on the market. 
3
3.  Data and unit root tests 
 (CFMA)—two major changes have 
been registered. From January 2001 to January 2009, we observed a sharp rise in transaction 
volumes in the financial markets, and a context of high volatility on the oil market. Between 
January and July 2008, oil prices increased to almost 147 US dollars per barrel and collapsed 
a few weeks later to under 35 US dollars per barrel. This context has left many analysts and 
researchers puzzled by the underlying explanations for determination of prices and the 
influence of the non-commercial players in the market. The interaction between a physical 
price based on geographical reference prices and a financial one based on futures contracts 
with the underlying assumption of a growing speculation factor seems to have changed 
drastically the market conditions. 
This brief description of the main changes in the oil pricing system leads us to consider five 
sub-periods in our empirical analysis: January 1973 to February 1982, March 1982 to April 
1986, May 1986 to February 1993, March 1993 to December 2000, and the period starting in 
January 2001. 
 
We consider a sample of 15 countries including (i) 11 countries belonging to the OPEC 
(Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Venezuela), and (ii) 4 other non-OPEC countries (namely Mexico, Norway, the 
United Kingdom, and Russia). Production and price series are extracted from Datastream. 
 
                                                 
2 The IPE became the InterContinental Exchange (ICE) in 2001. 
3 For more information, see the CFTC website at http://www .cftc.gov/lawandregulation/index.htm.   6 
We use monthly data from January 1973 to July 2009. Note that for some countries, 
production data are not available on the whole period. More specifically, we consider 
Indonesian production until May 2008, given that Indonesia leaves OPEC after that date. For 
Mexico, Norway and UK, the analysis begins in 1982—due to the establishment of a larger 
oil production policy than previously—while the Russian analysis starts after its creation in 
1991. Furthermore, we exclude Ecuador and Gabon from the analysis because of their coming 
and going into the Organization. 
 
Recall that our aim is to test for a cooperative  behavior between OPEC members by 
investigating the link between the production of one member country and the global 
production of the other OPEC members. For each country i, we define the production of the 
other member countries—which we call “rest of the cartel production”—as the difference 
between the total OPEC production and the individual production of country i.
4
                                                 
4 Note that in the appendix, the rest of cartel prod is denoted as “country2”. 
 
 
The crude oil price is the UK Brent in US dollars. It is expressed in real terms using the US 
CPI (extracted from Datastream) as the deflator. Finally, note that production and price series 
are expressed in logarithmic terms. 
 
The first step is to determine the integration order of our series. Given that our sample period 
is characterized by various oil pricing regimes (see Section 2), we consider a test robust to 
structural breaks. We rely on the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test. Under the null hypothesis, 
there is a unit root without any exogenous structural break, whereas the alternative hypothesis 
is the stationarity with a break date determined endogenously. The conclusions of the test are 
reported in Table A1 in the appendix and show that the majority of the considered series are 
I(1). Table 1 summarizes the results and lists the countries for which both the individual 
production and the rest of the cartel production are I(1). 
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Table 1. Individual and rest of the cartel productions integrated of order 1. 





























4.  Cointegration and Granger causality tests 
4.1. Time series analysis 
In order to test for the existence of a long-run relationship between the production of 
exporting countries and that of the OPEC, we rely on the Engle and Granger (1987) test based 
on the null hypothesis of no cointegration.  
 
Table 2. Results of the Engle-Granger cointegration test. 
Sub-periods  Cointegrated countries 
1973.01-1982.02  Algeria, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar 
1982.02-1986.04  Algeria, Indonesia, Mexico 
1986.05-1993.02  Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar 
1993.03-2000.12  Nigeria, Qatar, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Norway 
2001.01-2009.07  Iran, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia*, U.A.E.* 
*: rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10% significance level. Otherwise, the significance 
level is 5%. 
 
Results displayed in Table 2
5
                                                 
5 See Table A2 in the appendix for the detailed results. 
 show that, for the first three periods, none of the large producing 
countries is cointegrated with the rest of the Organization production. This result indicates 
that the individual shares of production are not constant over time. Countries for which 
cointegration is obtained do not account for more than 30 percent of the OPEC production. 
Contrary to the first three periods, the 1993.03-2000.12 sample is characterized by the 
presence of massive producers (particularly Saudi Arabia) accounting for nearly 50 per cent 
of the OPEC market share. Moreover, the absence of cointegration is also rejected for two   8 
countries belonging to our non-OPEC group, leading to the question of a possible larger 
agreement between producer countries. This sub-period could also be considered as some 
kind of “Golden Age” in terms of coordination within the Organization. Finally, in the last 
period (2001.01-2009.07), cointegration is observed for countries representing about 65 to 70 
percent of the OPEC production, but without any non-OPEC producers. As for the previous 
period, Saudi Arabia belongs to these cointegrated countries. 
 
It  is worth noting that during the first three periods characterized by the absence of 
cointegration for the major oil producers, the OPEC market share in world oil production was 
highly volatile and unstable (see Figure 1). On the contrary, this market share is quite stable 
since 1993. These findings may lead us to the conclusion that OPEC also fits its production 
policy according to the non-OPEC supply and demand.  
 


















































































To investigate the direction of the link between production and price series, we implement the 
Granger causality test.  
   9 
Table 3. Results of the Granger causality test. 
*: rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality at the 10 % significance level. Otherwise, the significance level 
is 5 %. Price-prod: null of no causality from price to production, prod-price: null of no causality from production 
to price. 
 
The first main conclusion that emerges from Table 3
6
                                                 
6 Detailed results are reported in Table A3 in the appendix. 
 is that, except for Libya, we can not 
reject the null hypothesis of no causality for each OPEC member during the first controversial 
1973.01-1982.02 sub-period (including two oil shocks). As a consequence, there is no 
evidence that production policies are linked to price movements, a result which is relevant 
with the fact that the price was fixed during this period. The second sub-period is mainly 
characterized by the rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality from price to production 
for the OPEC as a whole, illustrating the fact that OPEC is price taker. Whereas the links 
between price and production are relatively weak in this period, the null of no causality from 
production to price is rejected for major producers in the third period, with a feedback effect 
observed for Saudi Arabia. The sub-period following the counter shock is thus the only one 
for which the OPEC production policy seems to have had an effect on price. It reflects the 
abandonment of the “netback” pricing system from Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries 
which experienced the former system. For the fourth period, the main finding is the existence 
of a relation running from price to production for the OPEC. The last period is probably one 
of the most interesting, because several producers display a link from price to production in a 
context of increasing prices. Once again, OPEC is price taker. The characteristics of these 
countries are interesting as well. Actually, if we consider Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Kuwait, 
Libya and Iran, we can notice that, according to BP 2009 Statistical Review, these countries 
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These results lead us to test if there is a split between countries inside OPEC itself. We 
classify the member countries into two sub-groups:  
•  “saver” group: Iran, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. and Venezuela; 
•  “spender” group: Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq and Nigeria. 
 
This separation aims at investigating if some countries have more incentive to cheat than 
others. To explain this behavior, suppose that cheating is induced by the short-run wish to 
earn money. Various reasons may justify this behavior. The first one relies on demographic 
facts: a country with a large population and/or an increasing growth rate will have to “feed” 
its population. Second, the type of crude oil may play an important role. It seems reasonable 
to think that good quality crude (i.e. with the lightest and lowest sulfur content) will be easily 
sold (and at a higher price), whatever the price. Thus, the owner has a relative less incentive 
to let oil in the ground, which involves faster reserves depletion. Finally, the type of political 
regime matters. A democratic regime supposes regular election dates and so, a short or mid-
term view. Given that the population opinion obviously plays a crucial role in winning votes 
and elections, accounting for it may justify the “spending oil” behavior of countries to earn 
money. 
 
Table 4 reports some descriptive characteristics for our two groups of countries. The spender 
group is characterized by large population countries (from 28 to 240 millions), with a very 
valuable crude oil (but with small reserves), and a (relatively) flexible political regime. Note 
that the presence of Iraq is due to three major wars, which involves that political regimes have 
to rebuild the country. The saver group—characterized by a smaller discount rate than the 
spenders—is composed by small population countries (between 830 000 and 66 millions), 
with large R/P ratios, and relatively heavier crude oil. These countries are less democratic 
than the other ones; the two exceptions being Iran and Venezuela due to their specific political 
regimes. Furthermore, despite a low R/P ratio, Qatar is included too because of its high gas 
reserves, making oil business only as a complement into the Qatari GDP. Let us now 
investigate the specific properties of these two groups of countries through a panel data 
analysis. 
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Table 4. Descriptive facts. 
Countries  Population (in 
millions) (CIA 
Factbook) 







(R/P)/pop  Current Balance 
(2008 & 2009) (in 
$ billion) 
Type of Crude (Heaviness, Sulfur 
Content) (Energy Intelligence 
Group) 
Type of political 
regime (CIA 
Factbook) 
Algeria  34.18  1.196  10.2%  16.7  0.48  (34.45 & -4.26)  Light, Low Sulfur Content  Republic 
Indonesia  240.27  1.136  7.7%  10.2  0.004  (0.125 & 10.58)  Light, Low Sulfur Content  Republic 




Nigeria  149.23  2  5%  45.6  0.31  (39.36 & 10.01)  Medium, Low Sulfur Content  Federal 
Republic 




Kuwait  2.69  3.549 (b)  2.2%  99.6  37.03  (64.78 & 32.01)  Medium, High Sulfur Content  Constitutional 
Emirate 
Libya  6.32  2.172  30%  64.6  10.2  (35.7 & 8.257)  Medium, Low to medium Sulfur 
Content 
Authoritarian 
state, de facto  
Qatar  0.83  0.957  0.5%  54.1  65.18  (14.23 & 4.619)  Low to High, Medium Sulfur 
Content 
Emirate 
Saudi Arabia  28.69  1.848  11.7%  66.5  2.318  (133.5 & 26.5)  Medium, Medium sulfur Content  Monarchy 




Venezuela  26.81  1.508  7.9%  (a)  > 3.72*  (37.39  & 8.561)  High to oil sands, Low to extra 
high Sulfur Content 
Federal 
Republic 
*Assumption based on a R/P ratio equal to 100 years. (a): more than 100 years, (b): reflects a return to pre-Gulf crisis immigration of expatriates. 
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4.2. Panel data analysis 
To complement our time series analysis, we now implement panel cointegration tests by 
searching for a long-term relationship between the production of the various countries and the 
total OPEC production. We consider the seven tests proposed by Pedroni  (1999, 2004).
7
                                                 
7 Panel unit root tests have been applied (see Table A4 in the appendix) and show that all production series are 
integrated of order 1, whether one considers the complete panel or the two sub-samples. This confirms the 
findings obtained in the time series framework. 
 
These tests are based on the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Among the 7 Pedroni’s tests, 
4 are based on the within dimension (panel cointegration tests) and 3 on the between 
dimension (group-mean panel cointegration tests). Group-mean panel cointegration statistics 
are more general in the sense that they allow for heterogeneous coefficients under the 
alternative hypothesis: under the alternative hypothesis, there exists a cointegration 
relationship, and this relationship is not necessarily the same for each country.  
 
Results from Pedroni’s tests are reported in Table 5. As it is frequently the case, these results 
are somewhat mixed. They can be summarized as follows. Considering first the group-mean 
panel cointegration tests, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is always rejected, meaning 
that a long-term relationship exists between the production series, whatever the panel and the 
sub-period considered. Turning now to the tests based on the within dimension, the results are 
less clear-cut. Indeed, if the homogeneity assumption of the cointegrating relationship 
between countries is retained, our findings show that the null of no cointegration is not 
rejected in the following cases: (i) the 1986.05-1993.02 sub-period for the three groups of 
countries, and (ii) the 1982.05-1986.04, 1986.05-1993.02 and 1993.02-2000.12 periods for 
the group of spenders. To sum up, these findings tend to show that OPEC acts as a cartel 
especially with the group of savers since there exists a long-term relationship between the 
production of countries belonging to this group and the total OPEC production. The influence 
of the OPEC seems to be weakened on the 1982.05-1993.02 sub-period since no cointegrating 
relationship exists on this sub-period, including the case of the savers’ countries. This result is 
not surprising and illustrates the decreasing influence of the OPEC following the oil counter-
shock. 
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Table 5. Panel cointegration tests (p-values). 
  Panel cointegration tests  Group-mean panel cointegration tests 






All OPEC               
1973.01-
1982.02 
0.1086  0***  0.0001***  0***  0***  0***  0*** 
1982.03-
1986.04 
0.1720  0.002***  0***  0***  0.0002***  0***  0*** 
1986.05-
1993.02 
0.2974  0.2554  0.2700  0.3439  0***  0***  0*** 
1993.03-
2000.12 
0.0275**  0.0135**  0.0745*  0.1166  0***  0***  0*** 
2001.01-
2009.07 
0***  0***  0***  0***  0***  0***  0*** 
Savers               
1973.01-
1982.02 
0.3058  0***  0.0017***  0.0012***  0***  0***  0*** 
1982.03-
1986.04 
0.1923  0.0105**  0***  0***  0.0066***  0.0002***  0.0002*** 
1986.05-
1993.02 
0.2400  0.2045  0.2464  0.3342  0.0008***  0.0017***  0.0002*** 
1993.03-
2000.12 
0.1025  0***  0.0010***  0.0012***  0***  0***  0.0001*** 
2001.01-
2009.07 
0***  0***  0.0002***  0***  0.0347**  0.0958*  0.0022*** 
Spenders               
1973.01-
1982.02 
0***  0***  0.0053***  0.0089***  0.0020***  0.0043***  0.0049*** 
1982.03-
1986.04 
0.3919  0.1489  0.1329  0.0046***  0.0083***  0.0069***  0.0003*** 
1986.05-
1993.02 
0.3942  0.3983  0.3981  0.3980  0.0051***  0.0057***  0.0041*** 
1993.03-
2000.12 
0.1338  0.3505  0.3976  0.3915  0.0146**  0.0933*  0.1084 
2001.01-
2009.07 
0***  0***  0***  0***  0.0001***  0.0007***  0.0009*** 
*** (resp.**, *): rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) significance 
level. 
 
In order to investigate the direction of the link between production and price series, we now 
proceed to Granger-type causality tests. Results are reported in Table 6. When a causal link 
exists, it generally runs from price to production. Indeed, a causality running from production 
to price is observed only in the following cases: (i) on the 1986.05-1993.02 sub-period for the 
complete panel and the group of savers, (ii) on the 1982.03-1986.04 sub-period for the group 
of spenders, and (iii) on the whole period for the savers’ countries. These results tend to 
confirm the findings of the cointegration tests since they put forward a higher influence of the 
OPEC on the group of savers. They also highlight the growing role of the OPEC during the  
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1982.03-1986.04 sub-period—with a causality running from production to price in the group 
of spenders—corresponding to the introduction of quotas and the development of the spot 
market.   
 











All OPEC           
Price-Prod  0.1869  0.0040***  0.0083***  0.0242**  0.0875* 
Prod-Price  0.5534  0.1149  0.0157**  0.6285  0.8423 
Savers           
Price-Prod  0.2169  0.0006***  0.1157  0.0418**  0.0001*** 
Prod-Price  0.2189  0.1959  0.0966*  0.5502  0.1057 
Spenders           
Price-Prod  0.4736  0.1130  0.0332**  0.0822*  0.1979 
Prod-Price  0.9175  0.0409**  0.2196  0.7902  0.6738 
*** (resp.**, *): rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) significance level. 
Price-prod: null of no causality from price to production, prod-price: null of no causality from production to 
price. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the evolution of the production behavior of countries belonging to 
the OPEC, as well as four non-member countries that are considered as key players in the oil 
market (Mexico, Norway, Russia, and the UK). More specifically, we aim at determining if 
OPEC acts as a cartel. To this end, we rely on time series and panel cointegration and 
causality tests to investigate whether production decisions of the different countries are 
coordinated and if they have an influence on oil prices. 
Our findings shows that the influence of OPEC has evolved through time, following the 
changes in the oil pricing system registered on the market. In particular, investigating the 
OPEC behavior on various sub-periods, we find that, while OPEC’s influence was strong in 
the period that just follows the oil counter-shock, it acts as a price taker for the majority of the 
considered sub-periods since 1973.  Finally, by splitting OPEC into two groups, the savers 
and spenders, we show that OPEC may be viewed as a divided organization in the sense that 
it acts as a cartel mainly with a subgroup of its members.  
  15 
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Algeria  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(2) 
Algeria2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Indonesia  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Indonesia2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Iran  I(1)  I(0)  I(0)  I(0)  I(1) 
Iran2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Iraq  I(0)  I(1)  I(0)  I(1)  I(1) 
Iraq2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Kuwait  I(1)  I(1)  I(0)  I(0)  I(1) 
Kuwait2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Libya  I(1)  I(0)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Libya2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Nigeria  I(1)  I(0)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Nigeria2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Qatar  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Qatar2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Saudi Arabia  I(1)  I(2)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Saudi Arabia2  I(1)  I(0)  I(0)  I(1)  I(1) 
U.A.E.  I(0)  I(2)  I(0)  I(1)  I(1) 
U.A.E.2  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Venezuela  I(1)  I(1)  I(2)  I(2)  I(1) 
Venezuela2  I(1)  I(1)  I(0)  I(1)  I(1) 
OPEC  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Mexico  -  I(1)  I(0)  I(1)  I(1) 
Norway  -  I(2)  I(0)  I(1)  I(1) 
U.K.  -  I(1)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
Russia  -  -  -  I(1)  I(1) 
- : data unavailable 
I(0) (resp. I(1), I(2)) : series are integrated of order 0 (resp. 1, 2).  
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Table A2. Results of the Engle-Granger cointegration test. 
  1973.01-1982.02  1982.03-1986.04  1986.05-1993.01  1993.02-2000.12  2001.01-2009.07 
Algeria  -3.661401**  -4.635594***  -3.02  -1.80   
Indonesia    -3.947677**  -3.42**  -2.067579  -2.613474 
Iran          -5.205437*** 
Iraq    -1.479097       
Kuwait  -4.851446***  -2.351365      -3.09* 
Libya      -3.57**  -2.48  -1.699279 
Nigeria  -3.652785**    -4.59***  -4.700496***  -3.512724** 
Qatar  -6.498419***  -3.12  -5.79***  -5.146397***  -3.717335** 
Saudi Arabia        -3.730816**  -3.114570* 
U.A.E.        -6.38***  -3.071073* 
Venezuela  -2.368065         
Mexico  °  -5.215718***    -5.830182***   
Norway  °      -4.235935***   
Russia  °  °  °     
U.K.  °  -2.535484      -2.51 
Obs.  110  50  82  94  103 
Critical values 
associated 
(from Engle and 
Yoo (1987)) 
1%: -4.07 
5% : -3.37 
10%: -3.03 
1%: -4.32 
5% : -3.67 
10%: -3.28 
1%: -4.07 
5% : -3.37 
10%: -3.03 
1%: -4.07 
5% : -3.37 
10%: -3.03 
1%: -4.07 
5% : -3.37 
10%: -3.03 
*** (resp.**, *): rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) significance 
level. 
°: data unavailable.  
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Table A3. Results of the Granger causality test. 
*** (resp.**, *): rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality at the 1% (resp. 5%, 10%) significance level. 
Price-prod: null of no causality from price to production, prod-price: null of no causality from production to 
price. 
-: different orders of integration. 
°: data unavailable. 













Prod-Price  Price-Prod  Prod-
Price 
Algeria      0.1394  0.0169**    0.0057***  0.6418  0.1698  -  - 
Indonesia  0.9449    0.4685  0.5656  0.1425  0.9644  0.5177  0.5177  0.1397  0.7732 
Iran      -  -  -  -  -    0.0005***  0.2494 
Iraq  -  -  0.1902  0.0630*  -  -    0.8693    0.4157 
Kuwait  0.5418    0.6882  0.9961  -  -  -  -  0.0006***  0.4112 
Libya  0.0066***    -  -  0.9712  0.0083***    0.3839  0***  0.9666 
Nigeria      -  -  0.7185  0.0008***  0.3887  0.5623  0.8383  0.8253 
Qatar  0.7250    0.0143**  0.4219  0.3938  0.0052***    0.9589    0.5803 
Saudi Arabia  0.1260    -  -  0.0003***  0.0659*  0.4183  0.6188  0***  0.8805 
U.A.E.  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.0013*
** 
0.0014***  0.0001***  0.6882 
Venezuela  0.5976    0.0004***  0.4293  -  -  -  -    0.0676* 
OPEC  0.2359    0.0789*  0.6855  0.2506  0.0797*  0.0092*
** 
0.1525  0***  0.6339 
Mexico  °  °  0.0054***  0.9346  -  -  0.0001*
** 
0.5911  0.4669  0.7461 
Norway  °  °  -  -  -  -  0.7146  0.2452  0.6690  0.1007 
U.K.  °  °  0.6079  0.4237  0.4410  0.7902  0.3488  0.3488  0.7344  0.4619 
Russia  °  °  °  °  °  °  0.7868  0.6458  0.0052***  0.4406  
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 Table A4. Panel unit root tests (p-values). 
This table reports the p-values of the following panel unit root tests: Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003), Maddala 
and Wu (1999, MW) and Hadri (2000). The IPS and MW tests consider the unit root as the null hypothesis, 
while the Hadri (2000) test is based on the null of no unit root. 




  IPS  MW  Hadri 
All OPEC  0.3064  0.4652  0*** 
Savers  0.3238  0.3880  0*** 
Spenders  0.1321  0.5115  0*** 